Skeets-Johnstone: Response

this is not what Hockett does. He does not start with
the study of extant nonhuman animal communication.
He starts with what he labels "the design features" of
human language. In effect, his comparison shows what
nonhuman animals don't have, not what they do have.
Moreover, we cannot assume a similarity between the
communication systems of extant nonhuman animals
and ancestral hominid speech in the first place because
none of those systems involves the tongue. In fact,
extant nonhuman primates do not have tongues of the
shape or flexibility necessary to human speech.

Response
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
I thank Professor Bishop for his comments. My
response focuses very briefly on five issues, the ftrSt of
which is actually a two-pronged clarification.
1. When Professor Bishop states that "in the case of
iconic bodily representation, the channel employed by
the sender of a message is the sender's own body" but
that "in the relevant cases ofhuman language, ... speech
is the channel of communication," he confuses
similarity in iconic bodily representation between
primordial language and the Tanzsprache with speech
perception. I never said that human speech perception
bad something to do with iconicity. I said that it had to
do with tactile-kinesthetic experience and on these
grounds likened it to bees' dance-speech. Secondly, my
own wording has in one place confused the issue.
Present-day human language is not iconic. Linguistic
studies show, however, that primordial language was.
Hence my comparison between primordial language and
the Tanzsprache.

3. Professor Bishop says that Hockett "adduces"
thirteen design features. We must ask from where
Hockett adduces them. We do not have to look very
far, since they clearly come from human language. How
can it then be contingent that, as Professor Bishop
maintains, "humans are the only beings that use
language." We have known from the start that it is
contingent because, tongues aside, as fully developed
systems, animate communicative systems are species
specific. Hence, if we choose the design features ofone
system against which all other communication systems
are to be judged, we are quite arbitrarily deciding what
we will defme as language. We are giving a stipulative
defmition that could just as well have stipulated other
design features. An evolutionary psychologist put this
point very well when he remarked of Hockett's ftrst
design feature, a vocal-auditory channel, that it is a
"somewhat anthropocentric restriction." Indeed, why
aren't tactility or gesture represented? They too are
"channels." Arbitrariness is itself a wholly arbitrary
design feature; all creatures whose communication
systems demonstrate iconicity are excluded on a
technicality. Ironically, on the basis of the evidence,
this includes ancestral hominids---our direct kinfolk.

2. Professor Bishop remarks that the comparative
method Hockett uses is the familiar one used in
evolutionary biology. But it is not. Hockett himself
claims merely that his method is "modeled on that of
the wologist." Even to say modeled is saying a lot. The
difference is well exemplified by Professor Bishop
himself when in describing what be calls Hockett's
"plausible method," he states that "We assume that the
communication systems of our ancestors were similar
to those of certain extant nonhuman animals. We then
compare their communication systems with our own in
order to determine what sorts of changes had to have
occurred in order for human language to develop." But

4. Professor Bishop comments that I seem
"particularly harsh" with Hockett given the difficulty
in reconstructing the origin of language. My harshness
is in part due to the ease with which Hockett meets that
difficulty and the ease with which many people accept
his ease. Professor Bishop is nonetheless right in
faulting me for saying that Hockett's model is
ahistorical. It is historical to the extent that it sets out
design features on an evolutionary grid. The problem
is that the grid gives us no indication whatsoever about
bow the pinnacle creatures on the grid, those slowly
evolving hominids, were wagging their tongues in
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various ways until finally they achieved language, or if
they were not wagging their tongues, how their quite
other communication system turned into language. As
linguist Pulleyblank said, Hockett's "brilliantly
successful mutation" won't do. The absence ofstepping
stones from the nonlinguistic to the linguistic is
precisely what makes the schema Athena-like.
5. Finally, the focus ofmypaper is on the possibility
of an evolutionary semantics, specifically on what is in
the way of forging such a semantics. It is this task in
which I am interested. Clearing the path toward this
task and the task itself I believe to be of momentous
import to philosophy and to the values people bold in
their everyday and professional lives. For these very
reasons I do not believe an evolutionary semantics to
be simply a matter of recording differences and
similarities between us and them, and then admonishing
ourselves to act in certain more putatively humane ways.
An evolutionary semantics should itself carry us over
into a morality-and this on the basis of the sense
making it requires, a sense-making in which objects of
study are recognized as subjects in their own right.
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